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JONATHAN EDWARDS AND 
THE SENSE OF THE HEART 
William Wainwright 
This paper examines Edwards' attempt to make philosophical and theological sense of the 
regenerate person's new sense of the spiritual beauty of divine things. It is divided into six 
sections. The first two discuss the nature of the idea of spiritual beauty and Edwards' 
reasons for thinking that our apprehension of it is a kind of sensation or perception. The 
third explores the implications of Edwards' theory for the epistemic status of religious 
belief while the fourth and fifth examine his defense of the objectivity of the new "spiritual 
sense." The last section discusses the bearing of Edwards' remarks on current discussions. 
Jonathan Edwards is well known for his insistence upon a "practical" or "experi-
mental" religion that engages the human heart. At the core of the religion of the 
heart is a sense of God's excellence and loveliness, or of the beauty and splendor 
of divine things. 
The savingly converted enjoy "gracious discoveries" of "God, in some of his 
sweet and glorious attributes manifested in the gospel, and shining forth in the face 
of Christ"-for example, "the all-sufficiency of the mercy and grace of God" or 
"the infinite power of God, and his ability to save them ... " "In some, the truth 
and certainty of the Gospel in general is the first joyful discovery they have . . ." 
"More frequently Christ is distinctly made the object of the mind, in his all-suf-
ficiency and willingness to save sinners . . ." (FN 171). I Recalling his own 
conversion Edwards says 
The first instance that I remember of that sort of inward, sweet delight in 
God and divine things that I have lived much in since, was on reading 
those words, I Tim. i. 17. Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, 
the only wise God, be honor and glory for ever and ever, Amen. As I read 
the words, there came into my soul, and was as it were diffused through 
it, a sense of the glory of the Divine Being; a new sense, quite different 
from any thing I ever experienced before. Never any words of scripture 
seemed to me as these words did. I thought with myself, how excellent a 
Being that was, and how happy I should be, if I might enjoy that God, 
and be rapt up to him in heaven, and be as it were swallowed up in him 
for ever! (PN 59) 
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Again, Edwards tells us, "I remember the thoughts I used then to have of 
holiness ... It appeared to me, that there was nothing in it but what was ravish-
ingly lovely; the highest beauty and amiableness ... a divine beauty; far purer 
than anything here upon earth ... " (PN 63). "God," he says, "has appeared to 
me a glorious and lovely Being, chiefly on account of his holiness .... The 
doctrines of God's absolute sovereignty, and free grace, in showing mercy to 
whom he would show mercy; and man's absolute dependence on the operations 
of God's Holy Spirit, have very often appeared to me as sweet and glorious 
doctrines. These doctrines have been much my delight" (PN 67). 
Some express their new experiences by the terms "sight or discovery," others 
by "a lively or feeling sense of heart" (FN 171-2). Both expressions refer to a 
new understanding of spiritual notions. Those who have these experiences find 
that phrases like "a spiritual sight of Christ," "faith in Christ," "poverty of spirit," 
etc., had not previously conveyed "those special and distinct ideas to their minds 
which they were intended to signify; in some respects no more than the names 
of colors are to convey the ideas to one that is blind from birth" (FN 174). But 
now "things of religion" seem "new to them. . . preaching is a new 
thing ... the bible is a new book ... " (FN 181). Indeed, "the light and comfort 
which some of them enjoy ... causes all things about 'em to appear as it were 
beautiful, sweet and pleasant to them: all things abroad, the sun, moon and stars, 
the clouds and sky, the heavens and earth, appear as it were with a cast of divine 
glory and sweetness upon them" (FN 183). 
This paper examines Edwards' attempt to make philosophical and theological 
sense of these experiences. It is divided into six sections. The first two discuss 
the nature of the idea of spiritual beauty and Edwards' reasons for thinking that 
our apprehension of beauty is a kind of sensation or perception. The third explores 
the implications of Edwards' theory for the epistemic status of religious belief 
while the fourth and fifth examine his defense of the objectivity of the new 
"spiritual sense." The last section discusses the bearing of Edwards' remarks on 
current discussions. 
I. 
The objects of a sense or feeling of the heart are (1) "actual [i.e., lively, clear 
and distinct] ideas" (2) of things pertaining to the will or affections, (3) that 
involve a "feeling of sweetness or pleasure, or of bitterness or pains . . . ." They 
include (the ideas of') (1) "beauty and deformity," "good or evil," as well as 
"excellency," "value," "importance" and their opposites, (2) delight and pleasure, 
and pain and misery, (3) affective and conative attitudes, dispositions, and states, 
e.g., "desires and longings, esteem ... hope, fear, contempt, choosing, refus-
ing ... loving, hating, anger," (4) "dignity," "terrible greatness, or awful 
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majesty," "meanness or contemptibleness," etc., and (5) the non-evaluative 
characteristics upon which beauty and deformity, pleasure and pain, and attributes 
like dignity or majesty depend. 3 The object of a sense or feeling of the heart is, 
in essence, natural or spiritual good and evil, and what pertains to it. A sense 
of the heart involves pleasure or displeasure, a sense of things with respect to 
the good or evil in them. Natural good or evil is "good or evil which is agreeable 
or disagreeable to human nature as such ... " Spiritual good or evil is what is 
agreeable or disagreeable to people with "spiritual frames," i.e., to those who, 
because the Spirit dwells within them, love being in general (i.e., God and the 
beings that derive from Him and reflect Him) (Misc. 782, T 113-26). 
The "immediate object of this spiritual sense" is "the beauty of holiness (RA 
260), "the spiritual excellency, beauty, or sweetness of divine things" (Misc. 
782), "true moral or spiritual beauty" (TV II), "the highest and primary beauty" 
(TV 27)-a "new simple idea" that can't be produced by "exalting, varying or 
compounding of that kind of perceptions or sensations which the mind had 
before" (RA 205). 
What kind of idea is this? Or, put this another way, what does Edwards mean 
by "(true) beauty?" His remarks are open to at least three interpretations-that 
(1) "beauty" refers to the delight or pleasure which holy things evoke in people 
with spiritual "frames" or "tempers," that (2) beauty is a dispositional property, 
viz., the tendency of holy things to produce this pleasure or delight in the 
converted, and that (3) "beauty" designates a love to being in general, i.e., the 
consent of being to being in which holiness consists. 
There is some evidence that Edwards held the first or second view. He asserts, 
for example, that "That form or quality is called beautiful, which appears in 
itself agreeable or comely, or the view of which is immediately pleasant to the 
mind . . . this agreeableness or gratefulness of the idea is beauty . . . we come 
by the idea of beauty. . . by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea 
[thing] called beautiful ... " (TV 98). In "The Mind" 1 (332) Edwards assimilates 
beauty and excellence, and then says, "We would know, why proportion is more 
excellent than disproportion, that is, why proportion is pleasant to the mind and 
disproportion unpleasant." Passages like these imply that beauty is some kind 
of pleasure or agreeableness,4 or a tendency to produce it in appropriate cir-
cumstances. 
We probably shouldn't attribute the second (dispositional) view to Edwards. 
If "(true) beauty" referred to the tendency to produce a unique sort of delight in 
those with spiritual frames, the idea of beauty would be a complex idea or "mixed 
mode." This conflicts with the claim that spiritual beauty is a new simple idea 
(RA 205).5 
There are also problems in attributing the first view to Edwards. The philos-
ophers who most influenced Edwards (Locke and the Cartesians) explicitly denied 
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that ideas of pleasure and pain tell us anything about the nature of the objects 
that produce them. 6 The idea of true beauty does. Edwards thinks that the new 
"inward sense" agrees "with the necessary nature of things" and is appropriately 
"called by the name of light, knowledge, understanding, etc." He repudiates the 
suggestion that "the idea we obtain by this spiritual sense could in no respect 
be said to be a knowledge or perception of anything besides what was in our 
own minds," or that it is "no representation of anything without." On the contrary, 
the idea of spiritual beauty is "the representation of the moral perfection and 
excellency, of which we could have no true idea without it" (TV 99, 102-3).7 
A more compelling reason for doubting that Edwards identified beauty with 
pleasure (or a tendency to produce it) is that he so often speaks as if it were an 
objective property of the things that have it. One of Edwards' central theses is 
that God's nature and activity are overwhelmingly beautiful, and that the spiritual 
and natural beauty of creatures is a reflection of, or participation in, God's own 
beauty. The tenor of the passages that express these claims seems inconsistent 
with the suggestion that beauty is simply a sensation which holy things produce 
in the suitably disposed (or a power to produce it). Edwards was strongly influ-
enced by Locke and other empiricists. But he also belongs to a Puritan tradition 
that contains an important Platonic strand. 8 It may therefore be significant that 
Platonism thinks of beauty as an objective property. 
Finally, a number of texts appear to identify beauty with the consent of being 
to being. This, too, seems inconsistent with the notion that beauty is some sort 
of pleasure or delight. 
In "The Mind" 1, for example, Edwards assimilates beauty and excellency 
and then says "Excellency ... seems to consist in equality" (322, my italics). 
Or again, "excellency consists in the similarities of one being to another-not 
merely equality and proportion, but any kind of similamess ... This is an 
universal definition of excellency: The consent of being to being, or being's 
consent to entity" (336, my italics). Edwards continues to speak this way in later 
works. In Religious Affections, he says "The true beauty and loveliness of all 
intelligent beings does primarily and most essentially consist in their moral 
excellency or holiness," i.e., in their benevolence or love of being in general. 
"Holiness is ... the beauty of the divine nature" (RA 257, my italics. Cf. 
285f.). In The Nature of True Virtue, he asserts 'This secondary ground of 
virtuous love [viz., "pure benevolence to being in general"] is the thing wherein 
true moral or spiritual beauty primarily consists. Yea, spiritual beauty consists 
wholly in this and in" what proceeds from it (TV 11, my italics). "That consent, 
agreement, or union of being to being . . . may be called the highest and primary 
beauty ... [although] there is another, inferior, secondary beauty, which is 
some image of this ... which consists in a mutual consent and agreement of 
different things, in form, manner, quantity, and visible end or design; called by 
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the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, har-
mony, etc." (TV 27, my italics). Passages of this kind imply that beauty just is 
(i.e., is identical with) some kind of agreement. Primary or spiritual beauty is 
the same thing as benevolence or the consent of being to being, and secondary 
beauty is the same thing as symmetry, harmony or proportion, i.e., "uniformity 
in the midst of variety" (TV 28). 
But there are also serious objections to this interpretation. Edwards often 
speaks as if beauty were a property of holiness and hence not the same thing as 
holiness. For example, in Religious Affections he speaks of "the loveliness of 
the moral excellency of divine things ... the beauty and sweetness of their 
moral excellency" (253 f.), "the beauty of their moral excellency," "the beauty 
of his holiness," "the beauty of his moral attributes" (256), "the loveliness of 
divine things ... viz., ... the beauty of their moral perfection" (271), "the 
beauty of the moral perfection of Christ" (273), "the beauty of holiness, or true 
moral good" (274), and so on. Edwards also asserts that the unconverted can 
see everything that pertains to God's and the saints' moral attributes except their 
"beauty and amiableness" (RA 264). Since one can perceive benevolence or 
harmony without perceiving (relishing) its beauty, there must be some distinction 
between them. Finally, beauty is a simple idea. The consent of (conscious) being 
to being, however, is a complex idea composed of the ideas of (conscious) being, 
and consent. 9 
In short, there is textual evidence for the claim that Edwards identified true 
beauty with a spiritual sensation or a tendency to produce it, and also for the 
claim that he identified it with consent. Both views seem incompatible with 
some of Edwards' other positions. The first seems inconsistent with his belief 
that the apprehension of beauty is a "perception" of something existing "without" 
the mind while the second is inconsistent with his conviction that beauty is a 
simple idea. Can a coherent position be constructed from Edwards' remarks? 
Perhaps it can't. He may, however, have been driving at this: 
Beauty is identical with benevolence or agreement in somewhat the same way 
in which lightning is identical with an electrical discharge or in which materialists 
think that consciousness is identical with certain arrangements of matter. (This 
accommodates the fact that one can perceive benevolence or agreement without 
perceiving its beauty even though its beauty "consists in" benevolence or agree-
ment.) But benevolence is also the "objective" or "physical" basis of a disposi-
tional property, viz., the tendency to produce a new simple idea in those with 
converted hearts. The new idea is a delight or pleasure in being's consent to 
being which somehow "represents" or is a "perception of' benevolence. 
On this interpretation, the idea of true beauty resembles Locke's ideas of 
primary and secondary qualities. Spiritual delight is, in Locke's words, a simple 
"sensation or perception in our understanding" (Human Understanding II, viii, 
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8). The dispositional property is what Locke calls a "quality," i.e., a "power to 
produce those ideas in us" (ibid.). Benevolence is the objective configuration 
underlying this power. Like simple ideas of primary and secondary qualities, 
the new spiritual sensation "represents" or is a "perception" of its object. Just 
as "extension" can refer to the idea, the power, or the physical configuration 
which is the base of the power, so "beauty" can refer to the sensation, to the 
relevant dispositional property, or to benevolence. (My interpretation thus 
accounts for the ambiguity of Edwards' remarks.)'o 
Edwards' account of spiritual perception may be subject to some of the same 
difficulties as Locke's account of sense perception. II Is it, in any way, less 
satisfactory than Locke's? It might be in one respect. If my interpretation is 
correct, the idea of true beauty is a kind of delight or relish and also an apparent 
cognition. Can something be both? It isn't sufficient to argue that perceptions 
of objectively real value properties can be inherently affective (and thus pleasur-
able or painful), for Edwards doesn't think of pleasure and pain in this way. 
Pleasures and pains aren't qualities or affective dimensions of more complex 
experiences. They are discrete internal sensations. If spiritual pleasure is a kind 
of internal delight or thrill, however, it isn't easy to see how it can also be a 
true representation of something existing without. Ordinary pleasures and pains 
differ from visual or auditory impressions in lacking what Berkeley called "out-
ness"; they don't seem to point beyond themselves. Either spiritual pleasure is 
unlike ordinary pleasure in this respect, or it isn't an apparent cognition. 
In the next section we will see why Edwards calls the feeling of spiritual plea-
sure a "perception." Whether this resolves the difficulty, however, is doubtful. 
II. 
While the spiritual sense is closely connected with a person's will or inclina-
tion,12 it is a cognitive faculty-"a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, 
for a new kind of exercises of the ... faculty of understanding" (RA 206, my 
italics).13 A sense of the heart involves a person's will or inclination because 
"when the mind is sensible" of spiritual beauty "that implies a sensibleness of 
sweetness and delight in the presence of the idea of it," "the mind ... relishes 
and feels." But "there is [alsoJ the nature of instruction in it"; it is a "kind of 
understanding" (RA 272). 
Why does Edwards speak of this new cognition as a kind of perception or 
sensation? The influence of Locke (and possibly Hutcheson) provides part of 
the answer.14 
The object of the spiritual sense is a new simple idea, and Edwards shared 
Locke's conviction that simple ideas come "from experience" (HU II, i, 2). As 
Hutcheson said "Reasoning or intellect seems to raise no new species of ideas 
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but [only] to discover or discern the relation of" ideas "received by some 
immediate powers of perception internal or external which we may call 
sense ... " (Illustrations on the Moral Sense, 135). 
Spiritual understanding also involves a kind of relish or delight, and Edwards 
follows Locke and Hutcheson in thinking that being pleased or pained, like a 
feeling of tactual pressure or being appeared to redly, is a kind of sensation or 
perception. (All three believe that pleasure and pain are simple ideas.) 
Then again, the new simple idea occurs involuntarily, and Edwards associates 
sensation with passivity (Cf. "Subjects to be Handled in the Treatise on the 
Mind" 29). This too was a commonplace. For example, Hutcheson said that a 
sense is "a determination of the mind to receive any idea from the presence of 
an object which occurs to us, independent on our will" (Inquiry, Second Treatise, 
1, I). 
Finally, the mind's apprehension of true or spiritual beauty is immediate 
(non-inferential). "The manner of being affected with the" beauty of a thing 
"depends not on any reasonings . . . but on the frame of our minds whereby 
they are so made that" as soon as we perceive or cognize it, it "appears beautiful" 
(TV 99).15 A comparison with Hutcheson is again instructive, for Hutcheson 
argued that the power of receiving the idea of beauty should be called a "sense" 
because "we are struck at the first with the beauty" (Inquiry, Second Treatise, 
I, XII). 
It is thus clear why Edwards speaks of the new cognition as a perception or 
sensation. Whether he should have done so is another matter. 
There is little force in the third and fourth considerations. Our sensations (and 
the beliefs directly based on them) appear involuntary and immediate, but so 
does our recognition of the fact that 2+2=4. Passivity and immediacy aren't 
peculiar to ideas derived from (internal or external) sensation. 
The first two considerations carry more weight. Locke and Hutcheson identify 
reason with reasoning. Reason is sharply distinguished from the will and its 
affections, and from the senses. Its sole function is to manipulate ideas received 
from other sources. Edwards shares these views. 16 Reason doesn't have an affec-
tive dimension and doesn't raise new simple ideas. The cognition of true beauty 
has an affective dimension, however, since it involves relish or delight. Further-
more, its object is a new simple idea. Spiritual cognition must therefore be some 
kind of sensation or perception. 
This conclusion seems inconsistent with other aspects of Edwards' position. 
A number of Hutcheson's critics took exception to his moral sense theory because 
they believed that (1) at least some moral propositions are necessarily true, and 
that (2) necessary truths are discerned by reason.17 Hutcheson maintained that 
the moral sense grasps the goodness of benevolent actions and dispositions, i.e., 
perceives that benevolence is (morally) good. His critics objected that "Benevo-
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lence is good" is necessarily true, and that necessary truths are apprehended by 
reason. It is therefore significant that Edwards himself apparently believed that 
moral truths are necessary. 18 Nor is he likely to have thought that the connection 
between holiness (benevolent actions and dispositions) and spiritual beauty is 
only contingent; that holiness or benevolence might not have been truly beautiful. 
But if "Holiness is beautiful" is necessarily true, Edwards seems committed to 
the view that our knowledge of at least some necessary truths is derived from a 
sense, i.e., that some necessary truths are perceived by a kind of sensation. This 
isn't plausible. 
One may be able to apprehend the redness of a table without apprehending 
that the table is red. But can one apprehend the moral goodness of a benevolent 
action without apprehending that the action is morally good, or apprehend its 
spiritual beauty without apprehending that it is truly beautiful? The idea of beauty 
derives from experience in the sense that one won't acquire the idea if one never 
encounters beautiful objects. However, the idea doesn't seem to be a discrete 
feeling or sensation which is first received from experience and then incorporated 
in a judgment. On the contrary, receiving the idea of beauty appears to be judging 
that what one is contemplating is beautiful. Edwards seems committed to claiming 
that this judgment is necessarily true. Does it make any sense, then, to speak 
of a person's apprehension of a thing's beauty as some kind of internal or external 
sensing? 
If one were to interpret spiritual cognition as an "intellectual intuition" with 
affective overtones, one would avoid this problem as well as the one raised at 
the end of the last section. Spiritual "perception" would then be something like 
our immediate recognition of the prima facie rightness of an instance of justice 
or kindness on a view like W. D. Ross'. Edwards was familiar with at least one 
account of this type-John Smith's. 
Like Edwards, Smith insisted upon the inadequacy of a merely notional or 
intellectual understanding of spiritual things. He, too, thought that divine truths 
can only be understood by those who lead holy lives, and he, too, spoke of a 
"spiritual sensation." "The soul," said Smith, "itself hath its sense, as well as 
the body: and therefore David ... calls not for speculation but sensation, Taste 
and see how good the Lord is." Smith's spiritual sensation is an act of "that 
reason that is within us . . . [the] eye of the soul . . . our intellectual faculty." 
This intellectual intuition or perception of reason incorporates, but isn't identical 
with, love and delight. 19 (Smith doesn't find this problematic because he shares 
the Platonic view that reason itself has an affective dimension. Knowing the 
good involves loving it and delighting in it. 20) 
A view like Smith's sidesteps the two problems confronting Edwards-how 
a feeling of delight can also be an apparent cognition, and how a necessary truth 
can be grasped by a kind of sensation. Edwards' commitment to empiricism 
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precluded this solution. Philosophers like Locke identified reason with ratiocina-
tion, and insisted that simple ideas originate in experience (internal or external 
sensation). Edwards accepted these theses and therefore couldn't construe 
spiritual cognitions as rational intuitions. 
III. 
While the spiritual sense's direct object is true beauty or excellency, it also 
has an indirect object-spiritual facts or truths. There are two cases to consider. 
In the first, the spiritual sense enables us to recognize the truth of propositions 
that are logically or epistemically related to the excellency of divine things. For 
example, our apprehension of Christ's beauty and excellency produces a convic-
tion of His sufficiency as a Mediator (Misc. 782, T 126; RA 273, 302). A 
perception of God's beauty and excellency is needed to understand the nature 
of His perfections and the works which express them (RA 273, 302). To grasp 
the appropriateness of God's end in creation, viz., the communication of His 
glory, one must perceive its beauty. Those who appreciate the splendor of God's 
glory are the only ones capable of comprehending the fitness of the means He 
employs to secure it and thus understanding His wisdom (RA 274, 302). Nor 
can one discern "the amiableness of the duties ... that are required of us" unless 
one perceives the excellency of divine things (RA 274). One must also see the 
excellency of holiness to appreciate the "hatefulness of sin" (RA 274, 301) and 
thus be convinced of the justice of divine punishment and our inability to make 
satisfaction (RA 302). The spiritual sense, then, enables us to grasp the truth of 
a number of important doctrines. 
But it also helps us grasp the truth of the gospel scheme as a whole (RA 291 
f).21 A conviction of the gospel's truth is an inference from the beauty or excellency 
of what it depicts, viz., "God and Jesus Christ ... the work of redemption, and 
the ways and works of God ... " (DSL 8). "There is a divine and superlative 
glory in these things" which distinguishes "them from all that is earthly and 
temporal" (DSL 8). A spiritual person "truly sees" this glory (RA 298). His 
perception of it is as immediate and direct as a perception of color or the sweetness 
of food (DSL 18), and a conviction of the gospel's truth "is an effect and natural 
consequence" (DSL 8). The perception and conviction are nevertheless distinct. 
The mind infers the truth and reality of the things contained in the gospel from 
its perception of their spiritual beauty. There is, however, no "long chain of 
arguments; the argument is but one, and the evidence direct; the mind ascends 
to the truth of the gospel but by one step, and that is its divine glory" (RA 298 
f. Cf. Misc. 782, T 126).22 Since only one step is involved we can truly say that 
the divinity, or reality, or truth of the gospel is "as it were" known intuitively, 
that "a soul may have a kind of intuitive knowledge of the divinity [truth, reality] 
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of the things exhibited in the gospel" (RA 298).23 
The mind's object differs in the two cases. In the first, its object is a fairly 
specific doctrinal proposition (like "Christ would be a sufficient mediator") that 
is logically or epistemically connected with other propositions which affirm that 
some person or characteristic or activity or state of affairs is truly amiable or 
beautiful or excellent. Our spiritual sense enables us to perceive the truth of the 
latter and from this we infer the truth of the former. In the second, the mind's 
object is the content of the gospel as such-what Paul Ricoeur has called "the 
world of the text."24 The dominant or controlling or central features of this 
world---God, Christ, and the scheme of salvation-are perceived to be truly 
beautiful. On the basis of this perception one immediately concludes that the 
Biblical world isn't fictional, like the worlds presented in The Brothers 
Karamazov or Mohy Dick, but real. 
The inference also differs in the two cases. In the first, one infers that a being 
as excellent as Christ would he a sufficient mediator, or that the communication 
of God's glory ad extra would he an appropriate end for a divine being, or that 
eternal punishment would he a fitting punishment for sin. These propositions 
could be true even if God didn't exist and the gospel scheme was false. In the 
second, one infers that the gospel scheme is true. Only the second case, then, 
appears to involve an existential judgment. 
Edwards' view has some interesting implications. If my interpretation is cor-
rect, the new spiritual sense doesn't involve a direct or immediate or quasi-per-
ceptual awareness of God Himself. Instead, God's reality is inferred from the 
excellency and beauty of the things depicted in scripture. As we have seen, 
however, the inference "is without any long chain of arguments; the argument 
is but one, and the evidence direct .... " Because of the inference's spontaneity 
and immediacy, a person can even be said to have "a kind of intuitive knowledge" 
of divinity (RA 298). Edwards' interpretation of knowledge of God's reality 
thus resembles a familiar account of our knowledge of other minds and physical 
objects. While these things aren't directly perceived, their reality or presence is 
immediately inferred from sensations or impressions that are directly 
apprehended. Edwards thinks our knowledge of God is similar. Although He 
isn't directly perceived, God's reality is no more remote or uncertain than other 
minds are on his own view, or physical objects on a view like Locke's. 
If I am right, Edwards' position differs from a basic beliefs approach. One's 
belief in God isn't basic. On the other hand, the inference on which one's belief 
is based doesn't involve a long or complicated chain of reasoning, and is as 
spontaneous and compelling as our (alleged) inference to other minds or the 
reality of the physical world. The redeemed's belief in God is thus similar to 
some of Hume's natural beliefs-for example, the belief in the continued exist-
ence of unperceived physical objects and (perhaps) the belief in a designer. 25 It 
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differs in that the basis of the inference is a new simple idea which God bestows 
on the regenerate, and because the inference is sound. 
IV. 
In the final chapter of The Nature of True Virtue, Edwards attempts to show 
that "the frame of mind, or inward sense ... whereby the mind is disposed to 
delight in the idea of true virtue," i.e., relish it for its spiritual beauty, isn't 
"arbitrary" but agrees "with the necessary nature of things" (TV 99). Since the 
"frame of mind" which disposes a person to delight in true beauty (i. e., to be 
pleased with benevolence) is benevolence itself, Edwards thinks it will be suffi-
cient to show that benevolence agrees with the nature of things. He employs 
four arguments to establish his conclusion. 
First Argument: 
(I) A being with understanding and inclinations necessarily desires its 
own happiness (i.e., it desires what it wants or desires or finds 
agreeable). 
(2) Benevolence is the disposition to benefit being in general. Therefore, 
(3) A being with understanding and inclinations must approve of bene-
volence (for it benefits him). (From 1 and 2.) Hence 
(4) If a being with understanding and inclinations approves of vice 
(i.e., of malevolence or indifference to being in general), then his 
attitudes are inconsistent. (From 3.) 
(5) Virtue (benevolence) can be approved without inconsistency. 
(6) If virtue (benevolence) can be approved without inconsistency and 
vice (malevolence or indifference) can't be approved without incon-
sistency, then virtue agrees with the nature of things and vice 
doesn't. Therefore, 
(7) Virtue agrees with the nature of things and vice does not. (From 
4, 5 and 6.) (TV 101-2) 
The argument, if sound, shows that virtue agrees with the nature of things in 
the sense that loving virtue is a more rational (i.e., consistent) response to reality 
than loving vice. 
But the proof isn't persuasive. A person isn't inconsistent in approving and 
disapproving (or not approving) of the same thing if he or she approves and 
disapproves (or fails to approve) of it in different respects. And this is surely 
the case here. The wicked approve of benevolence when it benefits them but 
hate it, or are indifferent towards it, when it benefits others. They approve of 
(or are indifferent to) malevolence or indifference when directed towards others 
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but not when directed towards themselves. These attitudes may be reprehensible 
but they aren't inconsistent. Let us therefore tum to Edwards' 
Second Argument: 
(1) Benevolence is "agreement or consent of being to being." 
(2) Being or "general existence" is the nature of things. Therefore, 
(3) Benevolence agrees with the nature of things. (TV 100) 
Edwards establishes his conclusion by identifying the nature of things with 
what is, viz., being in general, and identifying agreement with being's consent 
to being. 
This too seems unconvincing. The argument only establishes a tautology-that 
consent to being (i.e., benevolence) consents to (i.e., agrees with) being (i.e., 
the nature of things). What needs to be shown is that benevolence or consent to 
being is an appropriate response to the nature of things, and Edwards' argument 
doesn't do this. But, this criticism is somewhat superficial, for it neglects the 
argument's theistic context. Edwards believes that being in general is God and 
the "particular beings" that depend on Him and manifest His glory. A consent 
to, or love of, being in this sense is surely an appropriate response to it. The 
theistic metaphysics becomes explicit in Edwards' 
Third Argument: 
(1) God "is in effect being in general." (All being either is God or 
unconditionally depends on Him.) 
(2) It is "necessary that God should agree with himself, be united with 
himself, or love himself." Therefore, 
(3) It is necessary that God is benevolent. (From 1 and 2. In loving 
Himself, God loves "being in general" and is thus benevolent.) 
Consequently, 
(4) Benevolence agrees with the nature of God. (From 3.) Now 
(5) Whatever agrees with the nature of what "is in effect being in 
general" agrees with the nature of things. Therefore, 
(6) Benevolence agrees with the nature of things. (From 1, 4 and 5.) 
(TV 100) 
This argument uses "agreement" in yet another sense. Edwards' point is roughly 
that the (ultimate) nature of things is divine benevolence. Human benevolence 
agrees with it because it is its image. 
Edwards is an occasionalist, an idealist, and a mental phenomenalist. What 
are "vulgarly" called causal relations are mere constant conjunctions. True causes 
necessitate their effects. Since God's will alone meets this condition, God is the 
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only true cause. He is also the only true substance. Physical objects are collections 
of "corporeal ideas" (color, figure, solidity, resistance, and so on). Minds are 
series of "thoughts" or "perceptions." If a substance underlay perceptions, 
thoughts, and corporeal ideas, it would be something that "subsisted by itself, 
and stood underneath and kept up" physical and mental properties. But God is 
the only thing that subsists by itself, stands underneath, and keeps up thoughts, 
perceptions, solidity, color, and other corporeal qualities (ideas). Hence, "the 
substance of bodies [and minds] at last becomes either nothing, or nothing but 
the Deity acting in that particular manner ... where he thinks fit. "26 The only 
real cause and the only real substance is thus God Himself. God's essence, 
however, is love. The real nature of things, then, is an infinite and omnipotent 
benevolence. 
Our benevolence "agrees with" this in the sense that it resembles it or is an 
image of it. The thrust of Edwards' argument is therefore this. Benevolence is 
appropriate because it mirrors reality. Nature's activity is really God's activity. 
Love is thus "natural" in the sense that it imitates the activity of "Nature. "21 
Edwards' theistic metaphysics is also implicit in his 
Fourth Argument: 
(1) Harmony among beings is more agreeable to the nature of things 
than disharmony. 
(2) Benevolence (the consent of being to being) promotes (or is) har-
mony among beings. Therefore, 
(3) Benevolence agrees with the nature of things. (TV 100-1) 
Edwards assumes that whatever promotes harmony in a system accords or 
agrees with its nature. This isn't implausible where the system is organic or 
social and, in Edwards' opinion, being in general is an organic or social system. 
The only things that exist without qualification are minds, and minds form a 
social system in which God is sovereign. 28 
Benevolence, then, has a "foundation in the nature of things." Since the 
spiritual sense is an expression of benevolence, Edwards concludes that it too 
is founded "in the nature of things." 'The idea we obtain by this spiritual sense" 
is thus "a knowledge or perception" of something outside our minds, a true 
"representation" of something "without," viz., God's moral perfection and excel-
lence and its created reflections (TV 102-3). 
Edwards' defense of the objectivity of the new spiritual sense has four steps. 
(I) Benevolence agrees with the nature of things. The world is an interconnected 
system of minds and ideas in which the only true substance and cause is an 
infinite and omnipotent love. Human benevolence is thus an appropriate or fitting 
response to reality. (2) Benevolence is pleased by benevolence; it relishes it, or 
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delights in it, for its own sake (TV 10-12). Since benevolence is an appropriate 
response to reality, so too is benevolence's delight in benevolence. (3) But 
delighting in benevolence is identical with perceiving its spiritual beauty. (4) 
The redeemed's spiritual perceptions are thus true representations of something 
without. 
How successful is this defense? The first two steps are plausible. While 
Edwards' occasionalism, idealism, and mental phenomenalism undoubtedly 
strengthened his belief in benevolence's agreement with the nature of things, 
similar conclusions follow from any theistic (or at least Christian) metaphysics. 
The second step is also plausible. Furthermore, the fourth step follows from the 
third if a "spiritual sensation" is a "representation" of something "without," i.e., 
if it is noetic or "perception-like." Edwards' arguments show that our spiritual 
sense is in order, that its motions are appropriate responses to reality. If spiritual 
sensations are only subjective feelings, the arguments simply show that they are 
appropriate reactions to their objects. If they are noetic, however, the arguments 
establish something more. If spiritual sensations are appropriate responses to 
reality, and are also apparent cognitions, they are (as Edwards thinks) a "knowl-
edge or perception" of something "without." 
The weakest link in the argument is the third. Because Edwards' identification 
of spiritual perception with a kind of pleasure is problematic (see sections I and 
II), his defense isn't fully successful. Nevertheless, Edwards' reflections provide 
a promising start. Benevolence may really be spiritual perception's underlying 
mechanism. The nature of this perception, though, and its relation to benevolence, 
needs further clarification. 
V. 
The most instructive feature of Edwards' defense is the way it uses theistic 
metaphysics. I suspect that any persuasive justification of a spiritual sense's 
reliability will do the same. Is it therefore circular? It isn't if theistic metaphysics 
can be established without appealing to spiritual perceptions. Does Edwards 
think it can? He believes that theistic metaphysics is supported by natural reason 
and sometimes suggests that the rational evidence is sufficient. On the other 
hand, he also talks as if it won't habitually seem sufficient to those with uncon-
verted hearts. 
If Edwards is right, justifications of spiritual perceptions aren't circular in the 
sense that they employ premises which explicitly or implicitly assert that spiritual 
perceptions are reliable. Nor are they circular in the sense that they employ 
premises which can in principle only be known to be true by those who rely on 
their spiritual sense. Nevertheless, there is a psychological or causal connection 
between having spiritual perceptions and appreciating the force of the evidence 
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for a theistic metaphysics and thereby appreciating the force of justifications of 
the spiritual sense's reliability. It seems, then, both that these justifications aren't 
logically or epistemically circular and that those who lack spiritual perceptions, 
or distrust them, will normally find justifications of this kind unpersuasive. 
An example may clarify my point. Suppose that someone sees the force of 
an inductive argument for the gUilt of his brother only after he has been persuaded 
of his brother's guilt. (Perhaps his brother confessed.) Is the argument circular? 
Is it circular for him? Not clearly. The nature of his noetic equipment isn't such 
that he can't know the premises without knowing the conclusion. Indeed, he 
may have firmly believed that the premises are true. Nor is its nature such that 
he can't see that the premises establish the conclusion. The fault isn't with his 
noetic equipment but with his attachment to his brother which blinded him to 
the force of the evidence and prevented him from using his noetic equipment 
properly. The relation between believing the conclusion and recognizing the 
force of the argument for it is thus extrinsic or accidental-the result of a 
psychological aberration rather than a matter of logic or the nature of his cognitive 
faculties. 
I think Edwards' view is similar. The reliability of our spiritual sense can be 
justified by a theistic metaphysics which is itself adequately supported by evidence 
accessible to natural reason. But sin blinds us to the evidence's force. There is 
thus a causal connection between spiritual perception and rational persuasion. 
Appeals to spiritual perceptions play no role, however, in the justificatory process 
itself. If this is correct, it seems misleading to say that the reliability of the 
spiritual sense can't be justified without circularity. 
VI. 
Does Edwards contribute anything to current discussions? I think he does. 
Edwards describes cases in which a person's belief in God is spontaneous, 
psychologically immediate, directly rooted in his or her experience but nonethe-
less inferential. These beliefs have been neglected in recent discussions. I think 
they occur, and suspect that at least some cases in which a believer claims to 
perceive God or God's activity are more aptly described in this fashion. That 
is, I think there is an interesting set of cases in which a person's belief in God 
is neither basic nor perceptual although it has a number of the phenomenological 
features that Alvin Plantinga and William Alston attribute to it. '" 
Another gap in contemporary discussions is a failure to adequately explain 
how theistic belief producing mechanisms operate. The issue is important for 
two reasons. 
First, the nature of the mechanism has a bearing on its reliability. For example, 
Freud offers several accounts of the nature of the theistic belief producing 
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mechanism which, if true, cast doubt on its reliability. Theists can defuse criti-
cisms of this sort by providing alternative and equally plausible accounts of the 
mechanism's operation that don't impugn its reliability. 
The second reason is this. On reading the Vedas, an Advaitin may find himself 
spontaneously believing that they express the Nirguna Brahman. On reading the 
/Sa Upanishad or having a monistic mystical experience, he may find himself 
spontaneously believing that all differences are unreal or that the impersonal 
Brahman is ultimate. If these beliefs are true, theism is false. On the face of it, 
the theist's beliefs and the Advaitin's beliefs are formed in similar ways. The 
same sort of belief producing mechanism seems involved in both cases. If it is, 
then if one is reliable, so presumably is the other. And yet they can't both be 
reliable, for they produce conflicting beliefs. Hence, neither seems reliable. 
What is needed is an explanation of the difference between theistic and (for 
example) Advaitin belief producing mechanisms together with an indication of 
why the former is reliable and the latter isn't. 
Edwards may provide some assistance here for he has the beginnings of an 
account of how one theistic belief producing mechanism operates. His account 
is also the right sort. If the mechanism is (a function of?) benevolence rather 
than wish fulfillment or the working out of an Oedipal complex, there may be 
less reason for thinking it untrustworthy. Again, if the disposition to form true 
religious beliefs is a function of benevolence or love, if benevolence or love 
agrees with the nature of things, and if benevolence is either absent or less fully 
developed in Advaita, one has some indication of why the theist's religious belief 
producing mechanism is more reliable than the Advaitin' s. 30 
My point, of course, is not that Edwards has provided a fully adequate account 
but that some account is needed to defuse a certain sort of criticism, and that 
the kind of account Edwards presents is the right kind. 
Finally, Edwards' remarks bear on the claim that justifications of the reliability 
of spiritual experience are inevitably circular. The claim is plausible partly 
because those who lack spiritual experience or doubt its reliability so often find 
these justifications unpersuasive. If I am correct, a position like Edwards' can 
accommodate this fact without conceding that arguments for the reliability of 
spiritual experience are circular in a philosophically significant sense. 
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NOTES 
1. Edwards' discussions of the sense of the heart are located in The Nature of True Virtue (Ann 
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Arbor, 1970), Religious Affections (New Haven, 1959), and the "Miscellanies" (a number of which 
can be found in The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from his Private Notebooks, ed. by Harvey 
G. Townsend [Eugene, Oregon, 1955]). For other relevant material see A Faithful Narrative of the 
Surprising Work of God, in the Conversion of Many Hundred Souls . .. ,The Distinguishing Marks 
of a Work of the Spirit of God (both in The Great Awakening, ed. by C. C. Goen [New Haven, 
1972]), "A Divine and Supernatural light" (The Works of President Edwards; 1968 reprint of the 
Leeds edition reissued with a two volume supplement in Edinburgh 1847, Vol. VIII), and "Personal 
Narrative" (Jonathan Edwards: Representative Selections, ed. by Clarence H. Faust and Thomas 
H. Johnson [New York, 1935]), and 'The Mind" (Scientific and Philosophical Writings, ed. by 
Wallace E. Anderson [New Haven, 1980]). 
2. Edwards believes that the immediate objects of mental acts are ideas. Like Berkeley, he tends 
to conflate ideas and their contents (what the ideas are ideas oj). 
3. Why regard these as objects of a sense or feeling of the heart? Presumably because (for example) 
a perception of beauty or importance, involves a perception of the non-evaluative features upon 
which beauty or importance depend, or because one can't fully grasp or understand these non-evalua-
tive properties without perceiving their beauty or importance, or both. 
4. Edwards clearly thinks that there are qualitative differences between pleasures. The pleasure 
which the natural man takes in secondary beauty (i.e., in "regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, 
proportion, harmony, etc." (TV 28) is qualitatively different from the spiritual person's delight in 
holiness. 
5. This isn't absolutely decisive. On Locke's view, "red" can be used not only to refer to a simple 
sensation but also to a power of producing this sensation that certain objects possess in virtue of 
their primary qualities, i.e., "red" can be used to express a mixed mode as well as a simple idea. 
I will argue that Edwards' use of "beauty" exhibits a similar ambiguity. Nevertheless, it is reasonably 
clear that Locke believed that, in its primary sense, "red" denotes a simple idea, and that Edwards 
thought the same of "beauty." 
6. See Locke, Human Understanding II, viii. Cf. Hutcheson who says that moral approbation, 
i.e., the disinterested delight in morally good actions and dispositions, "cannot be supposed an image 
of anything external, more than the pleasures of harmony, of taste, of smell." (Illustrations on the 
Moral Sense [Cambridge, Mass., 1971], p. 164). 
7. This point is inconclusive, however, since Edwards sometimes departs from Locke. For example, 
he asserts that beauty is a simple idea although Locke thought it was amixed mode (HU II, xii, 51). 
8. Edwards was influenced by Henry More (who self-consciously combined Platonism and Car-
tesianism). He was also familiar with Ralph Cudworth and John Smith, and quotes both with approval. 
9. Of course, Edwards might have believed that the relevant relational terms ("consents," "is equal 
to," "agrees with," "harmonizes with," etc.) stand for simple ideas, but he never says this, and 
while Locke thinks that the ideas of relations "terminate in simple ideas" (arise from the comparison 
of simple ideas) he doesn't seem to think that relations themselves are simple ideas (HU II, xxv, 
9-10; II, xxviii, 18-20). 
10. Does the idea of beauty not only "represent" but also "resemble" its object, as Locke's ideas of 
extension, figure and motion "resemble" the objective configurations that cause them? Edwards 
never explicitly says it does. (That the idea is a "perception" of "something without" only distinguishes 
it from ideas of tertiary qualities.) In calling it "knowledge," however, and in insisting that we can 
have no true idea of its objects without it, Edwards implies that the idea accurately represents (some 
aspect of) its object. This suggests that the idea of beauty should be assimilated to Locke's ideas of 
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primary qual ities. 
II. It isn't clear that the mind's immediate objects arc ideas. It isn't clear how they represent or 
resemble their objects. And so on. 
12. At one point, Edwards asks "concerning speculative understanding and sense of heart; whether 
any difference between the sense of the heart and the will or inclination ... " ("Subjects to be 
handled in the Treatise on the Mind" 14). 
13. Cf. RA 275. It involves a new "sort of understanding or knowledge . .. [viz.] that knowledge 
of divine things from whence all truly gracious affections do proceed ... " (my italics). 
14. Locke was a major influence. Hutcheson's Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue is referred to in Edwards' "Catalogue of Books" on p. 8 and p. 22. On p. 22, Edwards writes 
"Hutcheson's Essay on the Passions cited in his Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty 
and Virtue," which implies that he had read the Inquiry by that time. (Thomas H. Johnson ["Jonathan 
Edwards' Background of Reading," Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, XXVIII 
(1930-33), 194-222] estimates that pages 15-43 date from 1746 to 1757.) Hutcheson is mentioned 
three times in True Virtue, and quotations from the Inquiry occur in Original Sin on pages 225 and 
226. Hutcheson's An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections and Illustrations 
on the Moral Sense (two essays) appeared in 1728 (three years after the first edition of the Inquiry). 
This work is entered in the "Catalogue" on pages 22 and 32. In the "Book of Controversies," the 
"Nature and Conduct of the Passions is quoted, and this passage is incorporated into Original Sin 
but credited to Turnbull" (Clyde A. Holbrook, OS [introd.], 741). The implication is that Edwards 
was familiar with the two essays. Whatever he was significantly influenced by Hutcheson, though, 
is unclear. I shall argue that Edwards' sympathy with the empiricists is sufficient to explain why he 
thinks of spiritual cognition as a kind of sensing. The idea of a spiritual sense was, however, a 
Puritan commonplace. For example, John Owen said that God "gives ... a spirituall sense, a Tast 
of the things themselves upon the mind, Heart and Conscience." According to Richard Sibbes, "It 
is knowledge with a tast .. . God giveth knowledge per modum gustus." Francis Rous said that 
"After we have tasted those heavenly things. . from this taste there ariseth anew, but a true, 
lively, and experimental knowledge of the things so tasted .... For even in natural fruits there are 
certain relishes. . which nothing but the taste it self can tnlly represent and shew unto us. The 
West-Indian Piney [pineapple] cannot be so expressed in words, even by him that hath tasted it, 
that he can deliver over the true shape and character of that taste to another that hath not tasted it." 
(The quotations are from Geoffrey F. Nuttall, The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience, 2nd 
ed., Oxford, 1947, pp. 39 and 139.) Edwards was indebted to his predecessors for the idea of a 
spiritual sensation. His development of that concept, however, is heavily influenced by empiricists 
like Locke. 
15. Cf. Religious Affections, 281f where Edwards speaks of the immediacy with which this new 
sense judges of the spiritual beauty of actions, or The Nature of True Virtue 98-9. 
16. "If we take reason strictly-not for the faculty of mental perception in general [which would 
include sense perception], but for ratiocination ... the perceiving of spiritual beauty and excellency 
no more belongs to reason, than it belongs to the sense of feeling to perceive colors. 
work is to perceive truth and not excellency" (DSL 18). 
17. See, for example, the correspondence between Hutcheson and Gilbert Burnet. 
. Reason's 
18. Edwards clearly thinks that at least some moral truths are necessary. (See Freedom of the Will 
(New Haven, 1957), p. 153. Edwards' example is "It is ... fit and suitable, that men should do 
to others, as they would that they should do to them.") It is worth observing that Locke, too, thinks 
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that moral truths are necessary. (Human Understanding III, xi, 15-18; IV, iii, 18-20; and IV, iv, 7-10.) 
19. The quotations are from Smith's "Of the True Way or Method of Attaining to Divine Knowledge," 
Select Discourses (New York, 1978). (I have modernized the capitalization and spelling.) In his 
introduction to Religious Affections, John E. Smith denies that Smith's spiritual sensation is an 
intellectual intuition (RA 66). Quotations like the last, however, and the Platonic tenor of the 
discourse as a whole, seem to support my interpretation. 
20. "Intellectual life, as they [the Platonists] phrase it" is a nondiscursive "knowledge ... [that] is 
always pregnant with divine virtue, which ariseth out of a happy union of souls with God, and is 
nothing else but a living imitation of a Godlike perfection drawn out by a strong fervent love of it. 
This divine knowledge ... makes us amorous of divine beauty, ... and this divine love and purity, 
reciprocally exalts divine knowledge ... " (Select Discourses, p. 20.) 
21. This was not, of course, a new idea. Thus, Richard Sibbes said "God ... causeth him to see 
a divine majesty shining forth in the scriptures, so that there must be an infused establishing by the 
Spirit to settle the heart in this first principle ... that the Scriptures are the word of God." Or again, 
"How do you know the word to be the word? It carrieth proof and evidence in itself. It is an evidence 
that the fire is hot to him that feeleth it, and that the sun shineth to him that looks on it; how much 
more doth the word ... I am sure I felt it, it warmed my heart, and converted me." (Quoted in 
Nuttall, op. cit., pp. 23 and 39.) 
22. Presumably the argument is: 
(1) Gospel doctrines exhibit a divine excellency or beauty. Therefore, 
(2) Gospel doctrines are true. 
2 follows from 1 if doctrines that exhibit this supernatural radiance or splendor must have a supernatural 
author. (On this point see DSL 10, Misc. 256 [T 249], and Misc. 782 [T 126].) How is this 
generalization related to the argument? If the inference involves only one step, it can't be functioning 
as a premise. Perhaps, then, the generalization is an inference rule. Or perhaps Edwards thinks of 
it as a necessary truth. (If it is, then 1 immediately entails 2.) Or perhaps it is simply an inductive 
generalization from a set of "natural inferences"-judgments that the redeemed find themselves 
spontaneously making in the presence of the gospel, and which are trustworthy given that their new 
faculties are God-given. (If the third alternative is correct, the generalization plays no role in the 
argument.) 
23. A superficial reading of some passages might suggest, that Edwards thinks our knowledge of 
divine reality is immediate. Thus Miscellanies 201 (T 246f) and 408 (T 249f) assert that ideas which 
are clear and lively, and cohere with each other and with other ideas, are quite properly regarded 
as real or true. Those with converted hearts find the ideas of religion (scripture) clear, lively, 
internally coherent, and in harmony with their other ideas. They, therefore, quite properly take them 
to be real or true. But this "appearing real ... cannot be drawn out into formal arguments." It 
depends upon "ten thousand little relations and mutual agreements that are ineffable," "and is a sort 
of seeing rather than reasoning the truth of religion." But Edwards isn't clearly denying that the 
conviction of reality is inferential. (He may simply be insisting on its psychological immediacy and 
coerciveness, and the fact that it doesn't rest on formal arguments.) In any case, his normal view 
is that presented in "Divine and Supernatural Light" and Religious Affections, viz., that the reality 
of divine things is inferred by one step from their spiritual beauty and excellency. Nor is my 
interpretation adversely affected by Edwards' discussions of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. In 
both Religious Affections and the Treatise on Grace (Cambridge, 1971), Edwards argues that "grace 
in the heart. . is no other than the Spirit of God itself dwelling and acting in the heart of a 
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saint. ." (TG 70). The "principle in them" is "no other than the spirit of God itself, united to the 
soul, and living and acting in it, and exerting itself in the use and improvement of its faculties" (TG 
71). The saints thus "partake of that holiness by which He himself is holy" (TG 73, cf. RA I 97ff). 
It would be a mistake, however, to infer that a perception of God's gracious influence is (literally) 
a perception of God Himself. What one seems immediately aware of in this case are one's new holy 
dispositions and affections and their spiritual beauty. These are indeed images of "the excellencies 
and beauties of God and Christ" (Misc. 239, T 248), and a consequence of God's immediate action 
on the soul (TG 53, DSL 17), but they aren't God Himself. 
24. "Philosophy and Religious Language," The Journal of Religion 54 (1974), 71-85. 
25. Cf., e.g., Ronald J. Butler, "Natural Belief and the Enigma of Hume," Archiv Fur Geschichte 
de Philosophie 42 (1960), 73-100 or John Hick, "A New Form of Theistic Argument," Proceedings 
of the XIV International Congress of Philosophy V (1970), 336-41. But also see (e.g.) J. C. A. 
Gaskin, Hume's Philosophy of Religion (London, 1978), chap. 8. 
26. "Of Atoms" (Scientific and Philosophical Writings, p. 215). The quotations are from an argument 
"proving" that God is the only substance underlying corporeal properties. Edwards clearly thinks, 
however, that similar considerations show that God is also the only substance underlying mental 
qualities. 
27. Since God is (according to Edwards) the only true substance and the only true cause, there is 
a real sense in which He is natura naturans. 
28. Edwards also thinks that God (who is "in effect being in general") is triune and thus inherently 
social. 
29. See for example, Alston's "Religious Experience and Religious Belief," Nous XVI (1982), pp. 
3-12, or "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," in Faith and Rationality, ed. by Alvin Plantinga 
and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, Indiana: 1983). Or see Plantinga's "Is Belief in God Properly 
Basic?" Nous XV (1981), or "Reason and Belief in God," in Faith and Rationality, op. cit. 
30. It will be more difficult for a Christian to cast aspersions on (e.g.) a Vaisnava's religious belief 
producing mechanism. Vaisnavism is a theistic grace religion that values love. To discriminate 
between the Christian's and the Vaisnava's intuitions, one must either (1) distinguish between the 
quality of the Christian's and the Vaisnava's benevolence, or (2) appeal to cultural, or (less plausibly) 
psychological or moral, factors that impede the proper operations of the Vaisnava's spiritual faculties. 
The Christian might, however, concede that some true beauty is perceived in the Bhagavad-Gitii 
and the theistic Upanishads. For he or she may think that these texts, too, are revelations though 
not as perfect as the Christian revelation. (Cf. Clement of Alexander's claim that philosophy may 
have been "given to the Greeks directly; for it was a 'schoolmaster,' to bring Hellenism to Christ, 
as the Law was for the Hebrews." [Henry Bettenson, The Early Christian Fathers, London, 1963, 
p. 232.]) 
